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Consider the current vogue for deploying market mechanisms as tools for improvement in state 
education systems. The idea behind it appears to be something like this: we should grant parents 
some measure of choice over their particular children’s education, because doing so ultimately 
serves the interests of all children. It does so by creating a market mechanism in state education, 
which will lead to improvements in provision through the same pressures that lead to greater 
efficiency and quality when deployed in more familiar settings. 
This proposal has some initial plausibility, especially by dint of its appeal to the interests 
of all children, rather than (for example) the rights of particular parents to advantage their 
particular children if they have the ability and inclination. In this paper, I consider two arguments 
against the proposal, one unsuccessful, and one successful. Both hinge on demonstrating that it 
implies unpalatable claims about responsibility, because a market in education is acceptable only 
if we may hold children who are disadvantaged by the market substantively responsible for the 
factors that lead to their disadvantage. 
My plan is as follows. In Section I, I explain the argument in favour of parental school 
choice and a market mechanism in education, and explain why it seems more promising than 
other arguments for parental school choice. In Section II, I set out some philosophical 
principles, to the effect that showing equal concern implies a burden of proof such that any 
inequalities must be ones for which the disadvantaged party is responsible. The first argument 
against the market in education (given in Section III) seeks to rule out all market mechanisms in 
education by showing that they necessarily fail this condition on the grounds that children 
choose none of the relevant factors (principally, the ability and motivation of their parents). This 
argument fails, because it assumes that free choice is necessary for responsibility. I suggest that it 
is not, or at any rate that the burden of proof is on the person who claims that it is. The second 
argument (discussed in Section IV) is more modest. It seeks to indicate that a proposed market 
mechanism would need to meet rather demanding conditions in order for the children it 
disadvantages to be properly held responsible for that disadvantage. This argument – which is 
sound – offers some room for the defender of market mechanisms to evade egalitarian 
objections. Nevertheless, those conditions are sufficiently demanding that the scope left for 
morally innocuous market mechanisms in education is nevertheless very limited. 
 
I. School Choice 
 
A policy of school choice is one which grants parents freedom to choose between a range of 
options for their children’s formal education. There are many such policies, differentiated by the 
particular sets of options advocated, and the grounds on which each set of options is supposedly 
justified. So, for example, one might argue that parents should be free to pay to send their 
children to elite schools because preventing them from doing so would violate their right to 
spend their money as they wish (eg Nozick 1974). Or, one might defend parents’ freedom to 
choose between schools with distinctive religious or philosophical characters, on the basis that 
parents have a right to use their children’s schooling to shape their moral and religious 
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convictions (eg Fried 1978, p. 153; Bridges 1984: 57-58; Almond 1991, 200-1; and see also 
helpful discussion in Hand 2002).  
The argument under consideration in this paper seeks to justify parental school choice 
within a free state-run education system (though, if successful, it might justify other policies of 
school choice too), on the basis that doing so will allow us to take advantage of the purported 
benefits that the free market brings in other domains. Since the publication in the eighteen 
century of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, it has been 
argued that allowing unconstrained freedom of exchange between individuals, at prices they 
choose, of goods over which they have private property rights, produces a multitude of 
beneficial consequences. Competition between sellers has the effect of increasing quality, 
reducing prices, and eliminating inefficient or unattractive enterprises. The price mechanism 
(indicating the rate of exchange at which buyers and sellers are willing to engage in their 
transactions) sends signals to consumers about how they might efficiently satisfy their 
preferences, and to producers about how they should deploy their productive capacity. In 
general, we are told, the market serves – with an ‘invisible hand’ more deft than any coercive 
coordination might be – to arrange the production, exchange and consumption of goods and 
services to everyone’s benefit.1  
These arguments do not apply directly to education, which is importantly dissimilar in 
various respects (as I discuss in Section IV below). But, it is argued, having something like a 
market in education can have an analogously beneficial effect. In particular, giving parents free 
choice will force individual schools to improve, for fear of losing pupils (and hence, funding). In 
conjunction with a loosening of regulation, it will also create incentives for schools to diversify 
and experiment. Successful methods will be adopted by other schools, and the rewards will be an 
improvement in standards across the sector. In general, the proponents of a market mechanism 
claim that it is either the only or the best mechanism for ensuring that the state-run system is the 
best it possible can be.2 
Put more formally, the argument runs as follows: 
 
(1) We should adopt the educational system which maximally promotes children’s 
interests in a way which shows equal concern for all children. 
(2) A market mechanism in education is the best way of identifying and achieving an 
education system which maximally promotes children’s interests in a way which 
shows equal concern for all children.3 
(3) (Some measure of) parental school choice is necessary for a market mechanism in 
education. 
                                                           
1 See Mandeville 1924 and Smith 1976. Modern exponents include Friedrich Hayek (1948, 1973-1979: vols 2 & 3) 
and Eamonn Butler (2008). 
2 Examples are legion. For a selection, with particular reference to the state education system in the UK, see: Tooley 
1998, Blundell 2006, Stanfield et al 2006, Hlavac 2007 and Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove’s 
introduction to the second reading of the Academies Bill, Hansard 19 July 2010: column 24. 
3 Advocates of market mechanisms might say that this premiss should be stronger: A market mechanism is the only 
way of identifying and achieving such a system. I use the weaker version of the premiss here for reasons of 
argumentative economy. The argument is valid using the weaker version; the weaker version is much easier to 
motivate than the stronger version (which must demonstrate that no more effective mechanism than the market 
could exist); and the failure of the weaker argument necessitates the failure of the stronger. 
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(4) (from 1 and 2) We should adopt a market mechanism in education. 
(5) (Conclusion) (from 3 and 4) We should adopt a policy granting (some 
measure of) parental school choice. 
 
The argument is valid. It also has the attractive quality of using, in Premiss 1, a principle that will 
appeal to those of a liberal and egalitarian cast of mind. Such philosophers find many other 
arguments for versions of school choice unpalatable precisely because they fail to show equal 
concern to all children. In Section II I explain in more detail what that condition amounts to, but 
for the moment let us roughly understand equal concern to require, when deciding on policy or 
institutions, that no child’s interests are taken into account less than any others. This is vague, 
but gives some of the content of the egalitarian disquiet with school choice which I seek to 
capture. For example, the existence of fee-paying schools allows parents with the money and 
motivation to buy their children a superior education, at least in principle; allowing such schools, 
if it benefits anyone at all, benefits only the lucky children of rich and motivated parents. Or, 
again, an argument frequently levelled against allowing parents to send their children to schools 
with a view to their being instructed in a particular religious or moral viewpoint is that this shows 
unequal concern for the interest those children have in autonomy.4 Such criticisms of school 
choice indicate a tacit commitment to something like Premiss 1. So, using that Premiss has the 
powerful argumentative advantage of justifying school choice on precisely the grounds usually 
relied on by opponents to reject the policy. 
The validity and egalitarian attractiveness of the argument notwithstanding, the argument 
is unsound, because there are good reasons to reject Premiss 2. It is very unlikely that a market 
mechanism in education can indeed show equal concern for all children, because such a 
mechanism will almost always end up wrongly holding disadvantaged children responsible for 
the factors which disadvantage them. 
Before arguing this, however, I should make plain one possible line of attack which I will 
not adopt. Premiss 1 contains a placeholder, referring to children’s interests. So, the argument 
for school choice relies on our having a prior theory of what children’s interests actually are: until 
we have such a theory, Premiss 1 is incomplete. 
This is not merely a matter of careful philosophical book-keeping. Whether or not 
Premiss 2 is even credible depends upon what we think children’s interests actually are. This is 
because the market-based argument can’t even get off the ground unless we assume that the 
people exercising choice in that market – namely parents – are at least minimally competent and 
motivated to select the educational choices which best promote their children’s interests. That 
assumption is plausible only on certain theories. On the view that the relevant interest is in a 
pleasurable childhood, then the assumptions are reasonable, if we think that most parents are 
well-placed to know what gives their children pleasure, and well-motivated to give it to them. On 
other theories of children’s interests, parental competence, or motivation, or both, seem more in 
doubt. For example, on the view that the relevant interest is not pleasure as a child but pleasure 
maximised over a life, the assumption about parental competence is less plausible: the good 
                                                           
4 Such arguments come in two compatible versions: one could worry that such a policy violates the equal concern 
constraint either by unjustifiably privileging the autonomy of parents over children, or by leading to unjustifiable 
variations in autonomy amongst different children. 
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intentions of a parent need not translate into knowing what will make for the best life in the long 
run. Alternatively, if we think that children have a crucial interest in establishing critical 
independence from their parents’ conceptions of the good, then the assumption about 
motivation is threatened: many parents think it an important right (or duty) to inculcate their 
children with their substantive religious and moral views. 
I shall not discuss this (rather obvious) point further, because doing so would enmire me 
in the difficult question of what the correct theory of children’s interests actually is. The 
argument for marker mechanisms in education is plainly a non-starter if our theory of interests 
undermines the assumption that parents exercise school choice with competence and motivation. 
So, I shall assume for the sake of argument that the background account of interests is one on 
which it is credible to believe that parents are competent and well-motivated. As we shall see, 
even this assumption is insufficient to render the market-based argument sound. 
 
II. Equal Concern and Substantive Responsibility 
 
In a nutshell, the problem with Premiss 2 is this: a market mechanism in education fails to show 
equal concern, because it erroneously holds the children who are disadvantaged by a regime of 
school choice responsible for the fact. 
In this section, I set out a view of what the equal concern constraint requires. I then 
explain the account of responsibility on which my argument rests, and show why erroneous 
ascriptions of responsibility violate the equal concern constraint. I then go on in Sections III and 
IV to show that the ascriptions of responsibility implied by the market mechanism are indeed 
erroneous. 
The injunction to show all children equal concern is ambiguous between various 
different constraints, of varying egalitarian bite. Depending on one’s background political theory, 
one might take it to impose an extremely demanding condition – that one seek to equalise 
children’s attainment of some goal like wealth or welfare, for example – or something rather 
weaker, like the requirement that positions of power and influence be open to people on the 
basis of merit rather than heredity. For present purposes, I take the equal concern condition to 
imply just a norm of non-discrimination: 
 
The Principle of Equal Concern: A policy which treats individuals differentially, 
or leads to inequalities in the distribution of some good which is the focus of that 
policy, is justifiable only if there exists some relevant difference between people 
that justifies the differential treatment. 
 
In this, I follow Bernard Williams, who argued (1962) that the mere fact of our common 
humanity, tautological as it is, does at least imply that those who wish to treat humans 
differentially bear a burden of proof. It may be thought that this is far too weak a principle to 
capture the core of egalitarianism. Nevertheless, it is quite strong enough for present purposes. 
Importantly, both the egalitarian and their opponents can agree on it, though they disagree over 
which differences are relevant to justifying inequalities and how many inequalities are thereby in 
practice either condemned or vindicated. The substantive egalitarian will think the burden of 
proof is enough to render most inequalities impermissible. By contrast, the libertarian will think 
most inequalities acceptable, but can still endorse the principle because they think that the 
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processes that lead to inequalities (the different free choices made by individuals under a regime 
of absolute private property rights) pass the test. 
The principle of non-discrimination implies two important things for present purposes. 
First, it is weak enough that even a libertarian defender of school choice should accept it, and 
hence accept Premiss 1 of the argument given above. (That is true even though, as I argue 
below, the principle has implications that are strong enough to refute their position.) Second, it 
tells us what sort of justification has to be offered for policies which lead to inequalities. I take it 
that a ‘relevant difference’ means the following. Take an individual in unequal circumstances, 
which is to say circumstances where she suffers some comparative disadvantage in respect of the 
appropriate measure. That inequality is justified just in case there is a specific relation that 
obtains between that individual and her circumstances, such that the relation’s obtaining justifies 
the comparative disadvantage she suffers. This might take various forms. For example, one 
might justify a differential distribution of money on the basis that some people work harder than 
others and that differences in industry are relevant to financial desert; one might justify greater 
concern for one’s own children on the basis of the relationship which one shares with them and 
not others; one might justify elite higher education made available only to the talented on the 
basis that society will reap benefits overall. Many things might count as relevant differences, 
depending on one’s background theory of justice. The Principle of Equal Concern merely states 
that, in cases of differential treatment, some such defensible difference must be adduced. 
Let us now turn to the matter of responsibility. Ronald Dworkin (2000: pp. 287-8) and 
Tim Scanlon (1988: pp. 149-216, and 1998: pp. 248-251) have each distinguished between two 
senses in which we use the term ‘responsibility’. One sense has to do with identifying the causal 
role agents play in bringing things about. So, for example, some guests might come into my 
dining room, see some food on the table, and ask ‘Who is responsible?’, meaning ‘Who cooked 
this?’. The other sense has to do with who ought to bear the burdens and benefits of a state of 
affairs. So, if one of my guests dies half way through my starter, the others might ask ‘Who is 
responsible?’ meaning ‘Who should be punished for poisoning the soup?’; or if they arrive and 
there is no food on the table at all, they might ask the question, meaning ‘Who can we complain 
to about our empty stomachs?’ 
The first sense – called attributive responsibility (or attributability) by Scanlon and causal 
responsibility by Dworkin – picks out a descriptive concept. To ascribe responsibility in this sense 
is to claim that an agent played a certain causal role in bringing about a state of affairs. For 
example, this paper’s existence is at least partially attributable to me because of my sitting down 
and writing it. There is scope for some disagreement about precisely what causal role is indicated, 
but on most theories the things that are attributed to us are all and only the things that we freely 
choose to bring about. 
The other sense – which Scanlon and Dworkin dub substantive and consequential responsibility 
respectively – refers to a normative concept: something which grounds praise or blame, or claims 
for reward, compensation, punishment or something of that ilk. Now, neither Scanlon nor 
Dworkin is completely clear about what, in general, a judgement of substantive responsibility 
involves (as opposed to setting out some specific examples of such judgements). So, let us use 
the following schematic account as a way of sharpening the concept. To assert substantive 
responsibility is to claim that there is a relation between an agent and a state of affairs, and that 
this relation’s obtaining has some normative upshot. Or, to put it more precisely:  
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The Concept of Substantive Responsibility: an agent x is substantively 
responsible for state of affairs s in respect of a normative upshot Z just in case there 
is a relation R between x and s such that Z depends counterfactually upon Rxs. 
 
By ‘normative upshot’ I mean some claim about what x must, may, or may not do; or about what 
some others must, may, or not do in respect of x. And by ‘counterfactual dependence’ I mean 
that the normative upshot Z obtains, and (all other things being equal) would not obtain if Rxs 
weren’t true. 
This schema is deliberately broad: it delineates the outlines of the concept of substantive 
responsibility. Different moral theories will result in different conceptions of responsibility, 
depending on how the variables x, s, R and Z get filled in. Indeed, one and the same moral 
theory might contain more than one conception of responsibility: this analysis of substantive 
responsibility lends itself to a sort of pluralism, according to which different normative outcomes 
will be grounded by different relations between individuals, and that what is necessary and 
sufficient for substantive responsibility in one domain need not be so everywhere else.5  
In the context of political philosophy, questions about substantive responsibility usually 
arise when we are trying to decide what to do about disadvantaging situations that agents find 
themselves in. So, for example, Dworkin says that the crucial question about responsibility is 
this: 
 
 ‘When and how far is it right that individuals bear the disadvantages or misfortunes 
of their own situations themselves, and when is it right, on the contrary, that others 
– the other members of the community in which they live, for example – relieve 
them from or mitigate the consequences of these disadvantages?’ (Dworkin 2000: p. 
287) 
 
Dworkin’s point here, I take it, is that normative judgements about what people should and 
shouldn’t be expected to put up with presuppose judgements of substantive responsibility. In 
particular, a claim that someone should bear a disadvantage is just a roundabout way of saying 
that they are substantively responsible (in the technical sense identified above) for it: the two 
claims stand or fall together. 
We can now see the connection between the preceding analysis of substantive 
responsibility and the principle of equal concern. The latter shifts the burden of proof: the 
defender of policies which lead to inequalities must offer a justification for such policies. 
Moreover, it indicates what type of justification that must be. There must be some specific 
relation that obtains between each individual at the sharp end of those inequalities and the states 
of affairs which disadvantage her, such that the relation’s obtaining justifies the comparative 
disadvantage that she suffers. Only such a relation will be a ‘relevant difference’ of the sort 
required to justify inequalities. That is just to say that, on the appropriate account of substantive 
responsibility, she must be substantively responsible for her disadvantage. 
                                                           
5 Serena Olsaretti (2004: pp. 139-141, 159, and 2009) effectively defends this sort of pluralistic view about 
substantive responsibility, although not in the terms I’ve used here. 
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This gives us a useful way of assessing policies. Showing equal concern constrains 
policies as follows: a policy is unacceptable if it leads to comparative disadvantages for which 
people are not substantively responsible.6 The arguments in the rest of this paper seek to show 
that the proposal under consideration – namely, to incorporate market mechanisms into state 
education by instituting a regime of parental school choice – fails this condition. 
 
III. Against School Choice I 
 
It might seem as though the principles set out in Section II, if correct, make the impermissibility 
of a market in education almost too obvious to be worth stating. The obvious line of thought is 
roughly as follows. 
Parents are not equally competent, well-motivated, and well-placed for making school 
choices. Hence, a regime allowing such choice will lead to relative disadvantage, whatever the 
conception of interest that we use to measure it. The children of competent, well-motivated or 
lucky parents will get an education that promotes their interests well. Other children will be 
disadvantaged by an education that promotes their interests less well. In particular, their 
disadvantages will be both non-positional (since they will end up less well-off in absolute terms) 
and positional (since the well-educated will also thereby be more competitive in the subsequent 
competition for the necessary means for satisfying their interests).7 This is justifiable only if we 
can hold the children at the sharp end of this disadvantage responsible for the state of affairs; 
children aren’t responsible for having the parents that they do; so, they can’t be held responsible 
for disadvantages that arise from their having different parents. So, the policy of school choice 
required to instantiate market mechanisms in education fails to show equal concern for all 
children. For that reason, Premiss 2 of the argument in Section I is false, and the argument fails. 
This is an attractive line of thought. However, it doesn’t work. To start with, as it stands, 
it equivocates between attributive and substantive responsibility. On the one hand, we might 
understand ‘responsibility’ throughout to mean ‘attributive responsibility’. If we do, then many of 
the factual claims made are true. In particular, someone’s having parents ill-suited to playing the 
educational market on their behalf is something that cannot be attributed to them. On this 
construal, however, the informal argument is invalid, because the conclusion doesn’t follow. 
Claims about attributability are, strictly speaking, just descriptive claims about which relations 
obtain between agents and states of affairs: the fact that inequalities arise from an education 
market that aren’t attributable to children does not, strictly speaking, imply that those 
comparative disadvantages aren’t just. What we need instead is to conclude that children aren’t 
substantively responsible for those disadvantages. One way we might try to do so is to eliminate 
                                                           
6 Which is to say, the Principle of Equal Concern and my analysis of substantive responsibility together imply 
responsibility-sensitive (or ‘luck’) egalitarianism, albeit in a schematic form without the specific conceptions of 
substantive responsibility appended by the view’s various proponents. See, for example, Arneson 1989, Cohen 1989, 
and Temkin 1993: p. 13. 
7 Positional advantages are those whose status as advantages consists in being well-placed compared to others in the 
relevant respect: consider, for example, the advantage of being the fastest runner in a footrace, or being the richest 
participant in an auction. Non-positional advantages are those whose status as advantages does not depend on being 
well-placed compared to others. For example, if I am interested in reading ancient poetry, my being able to read a 
bit of Latin is a good thing irrespective of how good everyone else is at Latin. For further discussion of the 
distinction between positional and non-positional goods in education, see e.g. Brighouse & Swift 2006. 
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the ambiguity in the other way, and construe all instances of ‘responsibility’ above as meaning 
‘substantive responsibility’. But while that construal would make the argument valid, it would 
also make it question-begging: the premisses would assume precisely what the argument seeks to 
prove, namely that children aren’t substantively responsible for disadvantages arising from the 
market mechanism. 
One might think that the argument can be easily repaired by making explicit the 
assumption, which presumably explains the equivocation in the first place, that there is a tight 
connection between attributability and substantive responsibility, such that attributability is the 
relation which grounds the normative payoffs in the domain under scrutiny. Then, we can 
understand the factual claims to refer to attributive responsibility – which makes them true and 
non-question-begging – and the conclusion to refer to substantive responsibility – which gets us 
the desired refutation of the original argument for school choice. Made explicit, the assumption 
amounts to the following additional premiss: 
 
The Necessity Claim: an agent is substantively responsible for comparative 
disadvantages only if they are attributable to her.8 
 
Someone might believe the Necessity Claim because they hold one of a number of stronger 
principles. Maybe they believe that attributability is necessary for substantive responsibility in 
respect of any normative payoff, or that attributability is both necessary and sufficient for 
substantive responsibility in respect of at least some normative payoffs, or even both principles 
at once. It does not matter for present purposes, because whatever else they believe they have to 
believe at least the Necessity Claim.9 In what follows, I argue that the Claim is false, because there 
are circumstances in which we may be substantively responsible for a state of affairs which is not 
attributable to us, including substantively responsible for disadvantages that arise from that state 
of affairs.10 Moreover, there is a prima facie case for thinking that a regime of parental school 
choice is one such circumstance. So, in the case of disadvantage deriving from a market in 
education, the Necessity Claim is false, and the first argument against school choice fails. 
To show the first point: consider situations of emergency, in which someone desperately 
requires the help of an innocent bystander, who can provide that help at negligible risk to herself, 
but in a way which causes her some comparative disadvantage. For example, we might imagine a 
marathon runner, mid-race, who comes upon a baby drowning in a shallow pond, or a stranger 
who has been set upon by poisonous snakes. The runner is a competent swimmer, and (in the 
fortuitous manner typical of such examples) has a phial of antivenin on her person. She is also, in 
each case, the only person who can help: only she can save the baby, and nobody else nearby 
                                                           
8 I leave aside for the moment the question of whether it is sufficient. For illuminating discussion, see Olsaretti 
2004: ch. 6, Olsaretti 2009, and Steiner 1994: p. 216. 
9 One possibility which I don’t survey here, suggested to me by Michael Hand, is that one endorses a weaker 
Necessity Claim, which states that a child is substantively responsible for comparative disadvantages only if they are 
attributable to her (even if the same is not always true of adults). I think this weaker claim might be true, and if it is, 
it would suggest that this first argument has more going for it than I suggest. Since I haven’t time to argue for the 
weaker Necessity Claim, however, I shan’t assume so here. The arguments in the rest of the paper suffice to show 
that even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the defender of school choice on this matter, the argument given in 
Section I fails. 
10 Another, different argument to the same end is given by Zofia Stemplowska (2008). 
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possesses the antivenin. Let us also assume, for the sake of argument, that the runner is not 
attributively responsible for her being the only potential helper. She doesn’t choose that there’s 
no other competent swimmer present, and we can’t attribute the lack of alternative sources of 
antivenin to her either. These factors, which are not attributable to her, ensure that if she stops 
to save the baby or snake victim, she will suffer a comparative disadvantage in her marathon, 
perhaps losing the race. 
Most people would say that, lack of attributive responsibility notwithstanding, our runner 
is under a duty to provide aid, and would rightly be condemned if she refused to save the baby 
or produce the antivenin. Moreover, the duty in question is one which fits my general 
characterisation of substantive responsibility above. The normative payoff (the duty not to 
withhold aid) obtains just because a specific relation obtains between the runner and the states of 
affairs concerned, namely her being their sole useful occupant. So, we have a counterexample to 
the assumption that attributability is necessary for substantive responsibility. The latter can be 
grounded by the sort of relation exemplified by the situations of emergency I have just been 
considering. 
The crucial factor in these cases (and, hence, the relation which grounds their normative 
payoff) is not their picturesque urgency. What matters is not really that the baby and snake 
victim will die quickly without the runner’s aid: we could easily rework the thought experiments 
with a more dilated time factor. Rather, it is the fact that the runner finds herself in a situation 
where other people’s interests will be seriously harmed overall if she doesn’t act in a certain way. 
In general, when we find ourselves in such situations, we must make the best of a bad lot – and 
their not being attributable to us is neither here nor there, since the source of the moral demands 
on us is the claims made by other agents whose situation isn’t attributable to them either. So, the 
plausible line of thought goes, in such cases we have a responsibility to bear at least some 
burdens in order to do what least harms people’s interests overall.11 
If we accept this principle, then there is a prima facie argument for thinking that the same 
relation – and hence the same responsibilities – arise in the case of school choice. Indeed, this is 
what lies at the heart of the argument set out in Section I. If we find an education system which 
best serves children’s interests in general, howsoever construed, then everyone has a 
responsibility to bear at least some burdens to uphold it. As it happens (so the argument goes), 
free parental choice is necessary for both identifying and sustaining such an education system, 
because it is only through the diversity and trial-and-error of a market mechanism that we will be 
able to identify good educational practice. Individuals within markets are fallible, and can make 
bad decisions (both on the consumer side and the supplier side), but the beauty of the 
mechanism is that those bad decisions themselves feed into long term improvement overall. So, 
the disadvantages suffered by the children whose parents make bad choices are a necessary part 
                                                           
11 At this point it might be objected that this stretches the notion of responsibility too far. My claim here is 
effectively just an alternative formulation of the idea that we have a duty to uphold just institutions: if such broad 
duties as this are questions of substantive responsibility, has that latter concept not lost its distinctive character and 
become merely a way of labelling any normative conclusion in our political philosophy? 
I think not. Some relations between agents and states of affairs cannot obtain except against the background of 
certain political institutions. However, it still makes sense to think of the particular burdens that an individual bears 
as a result of the existence of those institutions as being ultimately a matter of a relation between them and the state of 
affairs for which they may or may not demand compensation, and hence a matter of responsibility. 
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of a structure which overall is best for promoting all children’s interests, and – by the principle 
set out above – they are disadvantages for which they can justly be held substantially responsible. 
 
IV. Against School Choice II 
 
The counterargument just set out is sufficient to sink the first version of the case against school 
choice and the market mechanism. Indeed, I think it has broader implications: it suggests that 
considerations of responsibility and equal concern will be unable to support a blanket ban on 
market mechanisms in state education. Nevertheless, reflection on the conditions of substantive 
responsibility does at least indicate two respects in which the argument for a market mechanism 
is conditional: it depends on an undefended (and, as I shall argue, unattractive) ethical theory 
about our interests, and it will work only for market mechanisms which meet rather demanding 
conditions. This suffices to offer a second argument against school choice, which is weaker but 
more effective. 
First, this argument for school choice depends on the following ethical claim: if we care 
about interests at all, we should seek to maximize the instances of interest-satisfaction over the 
whole population, with complete impartiality about whose interests they are, and how 
satisfaction or frustration is distributed. That will be true only on certain accounts of what 
interests are, and how they should be traded off against each other in cases of conflict. Many 
plausible accounts of interests reject at least one of the features mentioned above, because they 
deny that simple maximization of interest-satisfaction is either coherent or desirable. For one 
thing, some accounts of interests (those based on autonomy, for example) do not admit of 
interpersonal comparison and aggregation of interests, as the argument assumes. For another, 
even if we do think that interests admit of interpersonal comparison and aggregation, it is a 
further substantive claim to say that simple maximization is the appropriate principle to adopt. 
Our best political theory might tell us that there will be some limits to what disadvantages people 
should be expected to shoulder for the common weal. Such limits are possible even for the strict 
consequentialist: one might argue, for example, that we should adopt the set of rules most likely 
to produce the best sort of society possible, and that in such a society such disproportionate 
burdens would not be shouldered by those who don’t (and can’t) consent to it. 
My aim here is not to defend a particular theory of interests, but rather to show that the 
market-based argument for school choice presupposes some contentious claims about interests, 
namely that interpersonal aggregation and comparison of interest-satisfaction are both possible 
and desirable, and that there are no limits to the disadvantages that individuals can be expected 
to shoulder for the common weal. Since the argument makes those presuppositions, it is 
available only if one is prepared to accept them, for only if they are true will it be correct that 
children are substantively responsible for suffering disadvantage if that helps maximize interest-
satisfaction overall. 
At the very least, this reveals a burden of proof which the defender of school choice 
must bear, and it shows that many moral theories (those which deny interpersonal comparison 
and aggregation of interests, and those which think that there are limits to how an individual’s 
interests may be harmed for the sake of others’) will be incompatible with the market-based 
argument. As it happens, I also think that we can go further. Reflection on the character of a 
theory which could get round those limits suggests that it would be deeply unattractive for other 
reasons. Save for the proponents of especially procrustean forms of utilitarianism, few political 
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philosophers have defended the view that there are no limits to what we can do to the interests 
of an individual with a view to overall maximization. If we admit any limits at all, though, 
restricting the burdens borne by vulnerable children (which is to say, limiting their substantive 
responsibilities) is surely one of the most plausible candidates. If that is right, then I have shown 
not only that the defender of school choice bears a burden of proof, but also that it’s very 
unlikely that he or she could meet that burden. 
Turning from the ethical presuppositions of the market-based argument, it also faces 
problems when we consider the practical conditions that would need to be met for it to work. 
Classic arguments for the utility of the market depend on showing that the epistemic and 
coordinating effects of the price mechanism lead to the most efficient deployment of productive 
and consumptive capacity available (where by ‘efficient’ I mean roughly ‘producing as much 
preference-satisfaction with as little effort and as few resources as possible’). The argument for 
the market in education will work only if it has a similarly beneficial effect for educational goods, 
substantially improving overall quality in the system, and doing so notably better than any 
alternatives. Only then will the general advantages be sufficient to justify the disadvantages 
suffered by children at the sharp end of market inequalities. 
The problem is that there is reason to doubt this, because of the disanalogies between 
the classic marketplace of goods and services and the education system. The effectiveness of the 
market mechanism in the former depends precisely on those features which are absent in the 
latter. In the marketplace of medium-sized dry consumable goods, we assume rational self-
interested adults making decisions for themselves. In the educational case, we have parents 
making decisions on behalf of children.  The price mechanism of the marketplace delivers quick 
epistemic data and depends only on consumers knowing what they themselves desire, for what 
price, at the time of purchase. Getting the same epistemic payoff in the educational case requires 
either that parents have the knowledge and experience to know what makes for a good 
education, or that the state is able to identify it through the sort of (non market-based) research 
and inspection regimes that the argument assumes to be either impossible or unnecessary. In the 
marketplace, productive capacity is assumed to be flexible and responsive to the price 
mechanism. Educational institutions, by their nature, respond more slowly to the pressure to 
change, such that the period of improvement may last the whole of a child’s educational life in a 
particular institution. In the marketplace, overall improvement depends on adult consumers and 
producers taking risks, mindful of the chance of their purchasing decisions and commercial 
enterprises failing. In the educational case, the analogous driver of overall improvement is our 
sure knowledge that some schools will fail; the consequences of school failure are heaviest for 
the children concerned, who share none of the features – well-informedness, consent, and so on 
– which make the parallel (and generally less severe) failure of the entrepreneur palatable. 
What does this set of contrasts prove? Well, in itself it doesn’t offer a positive argument 
against school choice, because it doesn’t demonstrate that no market mechanism in education 
could meet the conditions mentioned. Nothing that I’ve said rules out the possibility that that an 
ingenious designer of institutions could devise a mechanism which pays due heed to the 
distinctiveness of the educational domain and still manages to have the epistemic and 
coordinative virtues of the market. What it does do, however, is to show what a difficult task that 
will be, by giving strong prima facie reasons for thinking that any market mechanism in 
educational will be neither effective nor just. If that’s right, then the disadvantages which the 
 12
mechanism guarantees cannot be justified – in which case, the prospects are bleak for a defence 
of school choice along these lines.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What should we make of the proposal to bring market mechanisms in the state education 
system? It turns out that the answer to this question – ostensibly a matter of practical policy – 
hinges on a much deeper pair of debates in political philosophy: the debate between egalitarians 
and libertarians about the propriety of basing state policy on principles of equality, and the 
debate (principally amongst egalitarians) about how best to understand the normative 
significance of individual responsibility.  
Noting the intractability of those philosophical debates, the pessimist might conclude 
that bringing philosophy into the policy discussion will serve only to paralyse it. What we have 
found instead, at least in respect of the matter under discussion here, is that reflection on the 
political philosophical foundations has decisive implications for policy. Let me conclude by 
drawing together the three lines of argument which show that market mechanisms in education 
are either unjustifiable, or at any rate tremendously hard to justify. 
First, the deep disagreement between egalitarians and libertarians belies the fact that 
there is at least one deeper principle over which they can agree. That principle is as follows: 
policies and institutions concerned with the distribution of a good must show equal concern for 
all citizens by ensuring that resultant inequalities in respect of that good are justified by a relevant 
difference between citizens. This is a minimal enough principle that even the most strident 
libertarian can endorse it: we just interpret their talk of private property rights and the 
inviolability of individual free choice as proposals for what we should take those relevant 
differences to be.  
Second, the debate over the proper role for responsibility in political theory has been 
muddied by two confusions: first, a failure to distinguish the concepts of attributive and 
substantive responsibility; and second, a tendency to conflate the two in practical terms by 
assuming that we are substantively responsible for just those things that are attributable to us. An 
analysis of the structure of the concept of substantive responsibility, and of the possible (and not 
mutually exclusive) conceptions of substantive responsibility that it permits, showed that this 
assumption is unmotivated, at best; and I gave some reasons to think that it should be rejected. 
Third, even the minimal principle mentioned above turns out to have substantive 
implications for policy. In light of my analysis of responsibility, it turns out that arrangements 
which guarantee inequalities – as a market mechanism in state education certainly would – are 
acceptable if and only if the individuals at the sharp end of those inequalities are substantively 
responsible for the comparative disadvantage they suffer. So, on the basis only of principles 
which even the habitual defenders of free markets and parental choice must accept, it looks as 
though the permissibility of a market mechanism in education depends on our answer to the 
following question: would the children disadvantaged by such a mechanism properly be held 
substantively responsible for the fact?  
My contention is that the answer to this question is ‘no’, and hence that the market-based 
argument for parental school choice fails. (Indeed, if the answer is indeed ‘no’, it shows not just 
that market-based arguments for school choice fail, but also that there could be no successful 
argument, and hence that the policy should be rejected out of hand.) I haven’t offered decisive 
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reasons to take that view. As we saw in Section III, the most obvious such reason, that children 
don’t freely choose their parents, turns out to fail because it relies on precisely the conflation 
between attributability and substantive responsibility that I rejected in Section II. Nevertheless, 
the considerations presented in Section IV should show how difficult it will be to support a ‘yes’ 
answer to my question. So, to the extent that we are moved by those considerations, political 
philosophy tells us this about the current vogue for a market mechanism in education: absent a 
serious attempt by its proponents to show that disadvantaged children are responsible for the 
fact, we should have none of it.12 
                                                           
12 My thanks to audiences at talks in Lisbon, York and London for helpful comments on the ideas in this paper, and 
especially to David Archard, Matthew Clayton, Tim Fowler, Michael Hand, Judith Suissa, Adam Swift and Andrew 
Williams. 
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